Background Briefing on U.S. Assistance to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government

Africa: Background Briefing on U.S. Assistance to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government: "

Background Briefing on U.S. Assistance to the Somalia Transitional Federal Government

Background Briefing by a Senior Department Official

Washington, DC

June 26, 2009

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SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Thank you all very much for coming this afternoon. I know that many of you are very interested in what is happening in Somalia today, and most particularly interested in the U.S. position with respect to Somalia and why we have, in fact, taken that position.

The U.S. is deeply concerned about developments in Somalia for several different reasons. All of you know that Somalia has been without an effective central government for the past 20 years, but in the recent months and recent years, the situation there has become increasingly unstable. The instability in Somalia today has generated a cancer inside of the country. We see enormous humanitarian problems around all of southern Somalia, where some 60 or 70 percent of the country’s population in the south are in need of some kind of humanitarian and food assistance.

We see widespread unemployment and we see large movements of people out of Mogadishu, which has probably lost over half of its population in the last couple of years – enormous numbers of people displaced.

We have also seen this cancer of instability metastasize to the region. We see enormous refugee flows out of Somalia into Kenya. Dadaab refugee camp in northeastern Kenya, built over a decade ago to handle 90,000 people, now has a refugee population in excess of 270,000. Some 6- to 7,000 Somalis leave Somalia every month and cross into Kenya.

QUESTION: What was the – I’m sorry, what was the original – what was it set up for?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Set up for 90,000 people.

QUESTION: Okay, sorry.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Today, a suburb of Nairobi, Eastleigh, probably is if not the largest, certainly one of the largest Somali cities in East Africa, reflecting the movement of large population groups out of Somalia into the safety of Kenya, taxing the services of the Kenyan Government in providing jobs, in providing schooling, in providing infrastructure to handle these large refugee flows. Refugees have also flown and moved into other parts of East Africa.

Another regional manifestation of the problem there is the contribution that it makes in continuing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In some ways, the fighting in the south of Somalia amounts to a bit of a proxy conflict between those two countries who have had longstanding border problems and disagreements.

And we’ve also seen the problem metastasize to the international level as well in the form of piracy. Because Somalia has no central government, has no police force, no court system, and because the economy, both the formal and the informal economy, have completely broken down, we have seen Somalis take to the sea to hijack an increasing number of international ships, including the Alabama Maersk¸ which was hijacked some two months ago, being an American vessel.

But the piracy, like the refugees, are an indication of how the instability, the continued instability in Somalia, has caused a great deal of concern.

The U.S. also is concerned that Somalia has become a safe haven for a small number of individuals who were involved with the destruction of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salam in 1998, August of 1998, and also for the destruction of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa in November of 2002, and the attempted destruction of an Israeli charter aircraft going into Mombasa.

For all of these reasons, but primarily for the first three, we think that we should do as much as we possibly can to support the African and regional efforts that are underway to help deal with this issue. The U.S. strongly supports the Djibouti process, a process organized and run by IGAD and hosted by Djibouti, which led to reconciliation and the creation of the Transitional Federal Government. We support that Djibouti process. We support the Transitional Federal Government that has come out of it, and we support the current president of that Transitional Federal Government, President Sheikh Sharif, just as we supported the efforts of the previous Transitional Federal Government president, President Yusef.

This is something that the African states in the region, all except one, have endorsed. It is something that the AU has endorsed. The only state in the area that has not supported the Djibouti process, has not supported the efforts of the TFG, is the state of Eritrea. Eritrea has played a spoilers role. They have allowed the – allowed ammunition and supporters of the al-Shabaab, the extremist organization, a terrorist organization, to move supporters and equipment across the border into – the Eritreans have allowed supporters of al-Shabaab to move back and forth across the borders to be resupplied. And we think that is of some concern.

Maybe I should stop right there.

MR. KELLY: Okay.

QUESTION: So what can you tell us about the decision to provide military assistance to Somalis, both materiel and training?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: As I said, we have supported the TFG, the TFG’s leadership, and we have provided the support of arms and munitions and training to the TFG military consistent with the efforts of the regional states. The governments of Uganda and Burundi have troops on the ground in Mogadishu in support of the TFG, and we have provided material assistance to the TFG government in order to help them stabilize the situation in the country and to deal – and to help deal with those regional issues that I described, as well as the international issues that have come out as a result thereof. We thought this was also in our interest because providing support to a more stable Somalia would give it an opportunity to deal with individuals who might also be seeking safe haven there, individuals who’ve been involved in terrorists and terrorist activities.

QUESTION: How recent was this decision, and how recently have they been supplied arms, ammunition, and has the training already started?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, we have been supporting the efforts of the Ugandan and Burundian forces since they went into Somalia nearly two years ago. And we have been providing support to the TFG more recently as their situation has become more --

QUESTION: How recently?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- become much more --

QUESTION: How recently?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Within the last year.

QUESTION: But it’s the last couple months, the arms, right? The arms --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes, the arms are --

QUESTION: -- for the last couple of weeks?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The arms are very new, but we’ve been providing support for some time.

QUESTION: Is this --

QUESTION: What kind of weapons are they, just to be simple? What kind of weaponry is it? What kind of ammunitions?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re talking about – we’re talking about small arms. And we’re --

QUESTION: And are these --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- small arms and limited munitions. This is not artillery pieces or armored vehicles or tanks. These are small arms.

QUESTION: And these are --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: These are weapons that would be used in an urban environment, fighting a counter-guerilla insurgency.

QUESTION: Is this --

QUESTION: I’m sorry; can I just finish up with this? Are they American weapons, or are you essentially providing the funds and then they’re purchased elsewhere?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re essentially doing two things: We have provided funds for the purchase of weapons; and we have also asked the two units that are there, particularly the Ugandans, to provide weapons to the TFG, and we have backfilled the Ugandans for what they have provided to the TFG government.

QUESTION: And then, last one for me on this, if I may. You’ve talked about how Somalia can be seen as a sort of --

QUESTION: (Inaudible)?

QUESTION: Yeah – as, you know, as a proxy conflict or a proxy war between the Eritreans and the Ethiopians. Can you shed any light on your efforts to persuade the Eritreans to cease their support for the insurgents? And I know you’ve said publicly that you have interest in perhaps going to Eritrea. Is there any – have they displayed any interest in seeing you there or anywhere else to talk about this?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I have indeed sought to engage the Eritreans so that we could talk about the issue of Somalia. I have said to them that it would be extremely useful for us to try to improve our relationship and bring it back to normal, but the basis on which that would be possible is for them to act in a responsible manner in the Horn of Africa, and to cease and desist their support for al-Shabaab. I have reached out to the Eritreans, and their responses have been slow in coming back.

QUESTION: Can I clarify something about the arms? You said you’re providing the funds for purchase of weapons. That’s going directly to the TFG? Is that what you’re saying when you say you’re backfilling the Ugandans?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That’s right.

QUESTION: Is that with money or is that with American arms?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: What we have sought to do is to do – as I said, to provide the TFG with resources to buy munitions and arms. And we have – and to pay for some of their training needs. And we have gone to the Ugandans when the TFG has run short of weapons and ammunition and have told the Ugandans to provide what the TFG needs. When the Ugandans provide those weapons, they give us a bill and an accounting for what they have turned over, and we then give them the money to replace the stores and the arms that they have –that they’ve (inaudible).

QUESTION: Can you quantify that at all?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No, I do not want to quantify at this point.

QUESTION: Can you give us a sense of the magnitude of it, the scope of this?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’ve shipped probably in the neighborhood of 40 tons worth of arms and munitions into Somalia in support of the TFG.

QUESTION: And is it ongoing? I mean, is this – this is going to continue, I mean, right? But so far --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes. Yes.

QUESTION: And that’s since when?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This has been within the last two months.

QUESTION: I have a couple.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And let me just say, I will say within the last six weeks – certainly within – to be more precise, because the al-Shabaab started a major assault on the TFG around the 7^th of May, and our assistance has substantially increased as a result of the (inaudible.)

QUESTION: And it was a direct result of that that prompted your decision to --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We felt that it was important to respond to the TFG request and the calls for support that were coming from the region and the concerns that the region had.

QUESTION: Can I just – on the arms, just as a ballpark figure, are we talking about a couple of million dollars or are we talking about under a million dollars? Are we talking about upwards of –

QUESTION: Are we talking about tens of millions of dollars?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No, we’re talking in the terms of the low millions. We’re not talking –

QUESTION: Single digits?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We’re going to get – start parsing this. We’re not talking about $100 million, we’re not talking about $75 million, we’re not talking about $50 million, and we’re not talking about $25 million. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: No, I just don’t understand what the reluctance is if you’re talking about – you know, if you’re acknowledging sending in arms, you know, whether it’s –

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I mean, at this point, it’s certainly under $10 million.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: A couple of things. I mean, the fact that you –

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It’s under $10 million.

QUESTION: The fact that you sent it in the last few weeks seems like you’re worried that al-Shabaab was on the verge of taking over the government. And I mean, can you relate that to your fears that – about al Qaida becoming a safe haven in the region?

Also, can you talk about the training piece, what the U.S. is doing in terms of training?

And then thirdly, I understand the head of the Puntland Government is here. What are your discussions with them? Do you see them as having any role whatsoever?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Go backwards. Third question: I believe that the president of Puntland is here. He is here at the request of Congressman Payne to participate in a set of congressional meetings – I don’t know if they would be called hearings – that occurred, I think, several days ago.

I have not met with the president of Puntland, and we have not been involved in any of his activities since his arrival.

QUESTION: So it doesn’t sound like you think – I mean, the Bush Administration used to talk to them quite often, so it doesn’t seem like you think they’re real players.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, that’s – I didn’t say that.

QUESTION: Well --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I just said that we had not spoken to them. They have come here at the request of Congressman Payne. And it may be that while they’re here we may see them, but we have not – we have not seen them. Puntland has exhibited a degree of stability that is to be encouraged and supported. And so it is not a – that we have a low opinion of them, but we haven’t seen them.

The second question --

QUESTION: Training.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Training. We have set aside money to help train the TFG. The Ugandans have done some training. The Burundians have done some training of TFG elements. And the Kenyans are also prepared to provide training. And we have and will assist in the payment for that training when it can be done in places that are close by or when they can be done inside of the country.

QUESTION: Are you providing logistical support?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We are not providing any logistical support to the TFG, but we have, in fact, provided logistical support to move the Burundians and the Ugandans in and outside of Mogadishu. And we have assisted them from the very beginning in their efforts to provide support to the TFG.

QUESTION: And then just lastly on the issue of the kind of timing, I mean, how concerned were you – are you or were you that al-Shabaab was on the verge of completely taking over Mogadishu and about fears that – I mean, I think Panetta made some comments this week that about fears that al-Qaida could be the next safe haven, that it could be the next safe haven for al-Qaida.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I haven’t seen Director Panetta’s statement, but let me say that we remain concerned about the prospects of an al-Shabaab victory, and we want to do as much as we can to help the TFG, the AMISOM forces, and the countries in the region to deal with a threat that impacts Somalia, the region, and the international community. We think that it’s important that the TFG be given an opportunity to establish stability and peace in the south and be able to deliver services to the people there.

A government run by al-Shabaab would be a government that would likely generate greater instability in the country, carrying out more of the atrocities and human rights violations, and would probably contribute to the continued instability and concerns that we have about providing a safe haven for global terrorists like Fazul Harun and Ali Nabhan, who were responsible for the 2002 bombings.

I draw your attention to what a Shabaab government would mean for Somalia by noting that the press carries today the draconian judicial – if one can call it judicial – procedures that they’re prepared to employ. For robbers, they will cut off the hand and the foot of those who violate their strict Sharia law. Somalia has always been a Muslim country, but it has practiced a moderate form of Sufi Islam. The kind of Sharia, the kind of Islam that al-Shabaab would practice is generally anathema to most Somalis.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) if I could.

QUESTION: I’m sorry, go ahead.

QUESTION: The first is who decided to provide the arms and training? Was that Secretary Clinton or the President?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It was a national decision.

QUESTION: We had in our story it was made at the highest level, so I would assume that means the President.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, the – it was a national decision.

QUESTION: Why can’t you say --

QUESTION: It was not the President?

QUESTION: Why can’t you say who that is, it’s expenditure of American taxpayer funds? It’s not a covert act.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, no, the – no, no, it’s not. And it’s – and the Secretary and the NSC agreed to this, yes.

QUESTION: And she has the authority; it doesn't have to be presidential authority; the authority has been delegated to her to --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, and we have been – as I said, we have been supporting the Djibouti process. We have supported for the last nearly two years the Ugandans and the Burundians as they have been on the ground defending the TFG leadership, defending the parliament, defending the presidential palace, defending the main port, and defending of the main airport. And the extension of funding directly to the TFG is consistent with our efforts and support to help the TFG as much as possible to gain stability in the region.

QUESTION: And if I could just clarify – it’s a simple question. The training is not being done by U.S. --

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No, there’s – let me just --

QUESTION: -- police or contractors or military or anything?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Let me be clear. There are no U.S. active duty or reserve military forces in Somalia, operating in Somalia, or acting on behalf of this.

QUESTION: Are they doing it in neighboring – are they doing it in neighboring countries?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No, no.

QUESTION: And does Djibouti have a role in training?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, they have assisted from time to time, but we --

QUESTION: In what respect?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: But I can’t – I don’t know the details, precisely what they’ve been doing, but no – this is not been regular U.S. military forces engaged and involved in this.

QUESTION: How much money has been set aside? You’ve said some money has been set aside to train the TFG.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That’s right.

QUESTION: Again, I’ll be the money guy and ask.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, we’re looking at a – at figures including arms and ammunition and training of less than $10 million.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) the training and the ammunition (inaudible).

QUESTION: Oh, it’s all included, the training and the munitions --

MR. KELLY: Libby, you have the last question.

QUESTION: Yeah, just to follow up on Elise’s question about al-Qaida, what can you tell us about – you mentioned there’s a, you know, a small number of individuals that have safe haven in Somalia. But how concerned are you about al-Qaida having a footprint there and their setting their sights on Somalia, especially if the U.S. forces in Afghanistan do have more success driving them out?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, don’t question it. It remains an important concern of the U.S. Government. The most important concern, however, is to be able to capture the individuals who were involved in terrorist acts in 2002 and in 1998. We do not want to see Somalia become a safe haven for foreign terrorists, and we believe that one of the best ways to prevent that is to help the TFG establish itself as a strong, legitimate government capable of enforcing its laws, protecting its borders, and arresting individuals who are working against them as well as against us and others in the international community.

The best way to do that is to help create a more viable Somali state which is not a threat to its people and not a threat to its neighbors, not a threat to international shipping, and not a threat to us in terms of harboring terrorists.

QUESTION: Would you say that --

QUESTION: Are they really moving over from Afghanistan and Pakistan?

MR. KELLY: I think that Mr. Senior Administration Official is just about --

QUESTION: But are they already (inaudible) over?

QUESTION: Well, this actually – I mean, this is an important point. I mean, do you – there

was some – during the Bush Administration, there was talk about –an effort to kind of engage the Islamicists. I mean, is that over? Have you completely given up on talking to al-Shabaab and trying to form some kind of accommodation? I mean, even though you’re giving these guys ammo and you’ve been doing – you’ve been supporting them for two years, they don’t seem to be able to kind of consolidate their power. So I mean, is there any kind of accommodation to be made?

QUESTION: Is there any hope for a reconciliation there?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, we continue to encourage the government of Sheikh Sharif to reach out to all moderate Islamic and Muslim forces in the area to establish an inclusive government that involves the clans and various regional leaders; all of those who are not intent upon carrying out extremist acts or terrorist attacks --

QUESTION: But not al-Shabaab?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We have – if there are individuals in Shabaab who are not committed to extremism and are prepared to accept an inclusive and moderate government, then we would say – speak to them. But to those Shabaab elements who are extremists, the answer would be no.

MR. KELLY: Okay. Thank you.

QUESTION: It sounds a plan to talk to Hamas.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No, no, no.

MR. KELLY: Thank you very much.

PRN: 2009/649

"

Africa Command Overview 2

Africa Command Overview 2 (3.3MB): "June 25, 2009"

Cryptome

Mamdani IPS Interview on Saviours and Survivors

POLITICS-SUDAN: 'Darfur Was Just A Place Where Evil Lived' - IPS ipsnews.net

Kristin Palitza interviews MAHMOOD MAMDANI, professor of anthropology and political science

CAPE TOWN, Jun 19 (IPS) - Analysing the colonial and historical roots of the violence in Darfur, Mahmood Mamdani concludes that the crisis in Darfur is not genocide, but a fight for land, triggered by drought, which has been racialised by outside powers.

Mamdani, a third-generation Ugandan of Indian descent is Hebert Lehman Professor of Government and director of the Institute of African Studies, at New York's Columbia University. He launched his book, ‘Saviours and Survivors. Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror’ at the 2009 Cape Town Book Fair on Jun. 16.

IPS: Why did you decide to write a book about Darfur and not another humanitarian crisis?

Mahmood Mamdani: I went to Sudan in 2003 for a few weeks to meet Sudanese intellectuals to get their sense of their society, the year the insurgency in Darfur began. A year later, Darfur was big news, very different from any [other conflict] on the continent. Even Rwanda hadn’t been that big news until the genocide was over. The answer was very simple: Darfur was the focus of a domestic movement in the United States, the Save Darfur movement.

In 2006, I began to get the backdrop when the GAO [United States Government Accountability Office] found that the mortality estimates of the Save Darfur movement of 400,000 deaths were the least reliable, because it took figures from an unrepresentative sample, while the most reliable figure came from the World Health Organisation, which said about 112,000 people had died.

When reading the reports, I realised that those who died had not necessarily been killed. The major cause of death was drought and desertification, which killed between 70,000 and 80,000 people, mainly children, while only about 35,000 people did of violence. There was a gap between what was made public and what was happening on the ground. The Save Darfur publicity was simply about violence. Nothing told you why the violence was happening.

I realised that the violence had begun in 1987-89 with the drought. And then the big powers got involved in the mid-80s. When [former president Ronald] Reagan came to power in the United States, he declared Libya a terrorist state, and the Cold War began to focus on Chad. The US, France and Israel supported one side in the Chad, while Libya and the Soviet Union supported the other side. The [US-led] opposition was armed and trained in Darfur. So when the drought happened in Darfur in the mid-80s, the place was awash with guns.

IPS: The main premise of your book is that the context of the crisis in Darfur cannot be called genocide. How did you come to this conclusion?

MM: I’m saying several things. We, the human rights movement, ignore issues and just focus on identifying violations, the perpetrator, the victim. We specialise in naming and shaming the perpetrator, and we demand criminal justice. In all this, what’s lost is a sense of the issues that are driving the violence.

Violence has a history. In Darfur, it was driven in the context of a drought and a land settlement, which was as old as the colonial period when the British had created tribal lands. There was no land given to Nomadic tribes. So when the drought came, they had no fallback. So [the crisis] was land- driven.

It wasn’t about race, but it began to get racialised. When the external agencies came in, they just assumed this was a conflict between Arab tribes and non-Arab tribes, and in this context the Arabs were the perpetrators and the non-Arabs were the victims. But the issue of land remained unaddressed.

IPS: You say the West’s humanitarian intervention is a cover for military invasion. What facts do you base this assumption on?

MM: Initially, I thought Save Darfur was another classic peace movement in the US. But I realised that Save Darfur was a war mobilisation. It’s slogans were ‘Out of Iraq into Darfur’, ‘Boots on the Ground’, ‘No Fly Zone’. Its emphasis was to never focus on the issues that were driving the violence. The entire focus was to demonise the perpetrator.

This emphasis was very much like the War on Terror, which said that any attempt to talk about issues was an apology for the perpetrator. Darfur was just a place where evil lived. They think if you do away with the perpetrator, the violence will stop. Yet the violence will go on, because the issues remain. If you understand the history of war, you understand victims and perpetrators are on the same side, and sometimes victims and perpetrators are the same people.

IPS: What is the post-Cold War international order and how does it related to the crisis in Darfur?

MM: If you think of the African conflicts that have found some kind of a solution, you realise that in all these cases, you had to move away from criminalising the opposition to seeing this as a political conflict driven by certain issues. The best example to me was the solution to apartheid in [South Africa].

This had also worked in Mozambique and in south Sudan. There had not been court trials, but political reform. We have to accept the possibility that both sides may have committed crimes, and if we agree on political reforms, we [let go of] the crimes so that we can have a fresh beginning and a rule of law whereby everybody can be held accountable. That’s the way to go.

IPS: Is there a hidden agenda to re-colonise Africa?

MM: We know there is greater attention on Africa today than there was ten years ago. We know the US is not the single global power. There are new powers on the horizon, like China. The contest between the US and China globally is focused on Africa. And in Africa, it’s focused on particular countries, and Sudan is one of them. It’s about natural resources, without a doubt.

The US is neck-deep in Chad, for oil and uranium, and China is neck-deep in Sudan for the same reasons. The contention of the two of them is unavoidable. But hopefully, with the Obama administration, there is a more sober assessment of American power and therefore a more sober realisation that the US has to learn to co-exist in the world. It can’t just call the shots. And I think we’ll be seeing this in terms of a new global attitude inside Africa.

IPS: Is Africa’s independence at stake? What should be the African Union’s response?

MM: The level of death and killing went down dramatically in Darfur after September 2004, to less than 200 a month. The main credit goes to the African Union (AU) because it figured out that the way to end the fighting was to put in place a political process, which would make negotiations and discussions possible.

But the AU was sabotaged consistently. The West, which is the Europeans, the Canadians, the Americans, agreed to fit the bill for the AU soldiers, and Africa agreed to provide the bodies on the ground, but [the West] never footed the bill.

Still, the AU has come out with some credibility. They have done much better than the UN. It was scepticism about the AU and the suggested political settlement, and huge scepticism about Africa being able to find its own solutions. Those who agreed to the AU coming in did it full of scepticism, as a temporary measure, simply because the West was not willing or ready to come in.

Therefore they never provided the resources they said they were going to provide and never honoured the conditions they said they were going to honour. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy. But still, the AU has done the most credible job of anybody in Sudan in that short space of time.

IPS: Your book ends with a proposal for a triple solution: regionally negotiated peace, combined with power reform in Sudan and land and governance reform in Darfur. Why do you think this would work?

MM: There are several lessons here. One, you can’t get big powers to come and solve your problems. If you need external involvement to solve a conflict, it is best if that involvement comes from your neighbours through an organised arrangement, either regional or continental. They will have a real interest in making peace in that country, because they will always be neighbours.

Second, Sudan needs power reforms like most countries becoming newly independent. You cannot expect a full-blown democracy being delivered in the womb of a colony. It’s absurd. Creating representative power takes internal struggles.

The most intractable will be the land question. Partly because it’s embedded in the tribal settlement of land that came out of the colonial period and then in the notions of absolute ownership of land.

If Uganda Has Oil It Must Need The Pentagon’s Democracy « Crossed Crocodiles

Crossed Crocodiles 17 June 2009
If Uganda Has Oil It Must Need The Pentagon’s Democracy « Crossed Crocodiles

If there is oil in Uganda, there must be bad people there who need the Pentagon to bring them democracy, a colleague observed. And indeed this is in part correct, there are some very bad people there. The Lords Resistance Army has plagued Uganda for 20 years, committing murders and atrocities, and kidnapping children to be child soldiers and sex slaves.

The US has not taken much notice of this until very recently. The Ugandan Army has stepped up its battle against the LRA in recent years, and the LRA has moved and expanded its operations into the DRC, as well as Sudan and the Central African Republic. In December 2008, the US Africa Command, AFRICOM, helped plan and arm a badly botched raid on the LRA, including contributing $1 million worth of fuel. Without the money for fuel, the raid could not have taken place. No effort was made to warn or defend the civilian population. The raid failed, the raiders came up empty handed, but the LRA attacked the civilian population in reprisal. It carried on a reign of terror throughout areas of the DRC that went on for weeks and months. Hundreds have been killed and maimed, children were kidnapped, and are still being kidnapped, and hundreds of thousands displaced.

............

Scott Gration - Current Status of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Recent Travels

Current Status of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Recent Travels

Scott Gration

Special Envoy to Sudan

Washington, DC

June 17, 2009

MR. KELLY: Good morning. We’re very pleased to have with us today Scott Gration. General Gration grew up in the now Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya. He served in the Air Force from 1974 to 2006. Among his assignments, in 1995, he was in command of the 4404^th Operations Group in Saudi Arabia. In 1996, he was in Turkey and oversaw Operation Northern Watch, which enforced, as you know, the no-fly zone over Iraq. Among his Pentagon assignments, in 2000 and 2001 he was Deputy Director for Operations in the Joint Staff in Washington and was also Director, Strategy Plans and Policy Directorate of the United States European Command in Stuttgart. General Gration speaks Swahili and has a Masters – well, he has a B.A. from Rutgers and a Masters from Georgetown in National Security Studies.

General Gration was appointed as the President’s Special Envoy to Sudan on March 18, 2009, and we’re very pleased to have him with us here today. He’ll make some remarks and then take a few questions.

MR. GRATION: Thank you very much for that kind introduction, and good morning. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to share some of the things that I’ve learned since becoming the Special Envoy to Sudan. I’ll tell you what we’ve been doing in the last three months, and then I’ll give you an idea of what we plan to do in the next few months.

Since my appointment on the 18^th of March I’ve made three overseas trips. The first was to Sudan, where I traveled to Darfur, Juba, Abyei, and to Khartoum. The second was to Sudan’s neighborhood, to Doha, to Cairo, N’Djamena. The last trip was to London and Paris and

Beijing. I’ve learned through these trips that we need to have constructive dialogue with the international community, with all parties in Sudan. We need to have engagement with all parties to save lives in Sudan, to bring about a lasting peace. More suffering in Sudan is simply unacceptable. We need engagement to make a positive difference in Darfur. We need engagement to fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

This isn’t about discussions only. It’s about making a difference in the lives of the Sudanese people. It’s about getting results.

Our initial efforts to build multiple channels of dialogue have produced some positive results. We’ve been able to work with the Government of Sudan and NGOs and the United Nations to restore humanitarian assistance capacity in Darfur. Three new NGOs are joining the international humanitarian assistance team in Darfur. Along with that, the UN and remaining NGOs have been able to increase their capacity. And we’ve essentially closed the humanitarian gap that existed in Darfur when the 13 NGOs were expelled.

The situation remains fragile, and the short-term interventions by USAID and its partners still need to be strengthened. The constructive dialogue will also help us negotiate a ceasefire in Darfur so that the people living in IDP camps and refugee camps have the opportunity to move back to a place of their own choosing and to be able to live in safety and security and dignity.

This dialogue engagement is also helping us in the second round of the talks in Doha, a process that’s designed to produce a political settlement to Darfur, a process that is designed to improve relations between Chad and Sudan, and to stop the fighting and violence that has been so disruptive. The dialogue and engagement will also be critical as we implement all the aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Before the referendum for self-determination is held on January 2011, we have a lot of work to do. We have to secure agreements on border demarcations, wealth sharing, power sharing. In addition, we have to make sure that all parties are involved to ensure that places like Abyei do not become the next war zone in Sudan. To successfully tackle these challenges, we need the support of the international community. We must continue to deepen and broaden international coordination in Sudan.

One initiative in this direction is the Forum for Supporters of the CPA. This event that will be held on the 23^rd is an event where we will bring together over 30 countries and organizations to help restore that international commitment and to rekindle the passion that we had in Naivasha in 2005 when the CPA was signed.

Before I take your questions, let me tell you about the tight timeline that we have to work within. We only have eight months to get ready for the national elections, and we only have 19 months before that referendum that will determine the future of Abyei and of Southern Sudan. With these events fast approaching, it’s absolutely critical that we work together, that we seize every opportunity to save lives, to facilitate a lasting peace in Sudan, and to promote stability and security in the entire region.

I’m ready for your questions.

..........

How To Communicate Securely in Repressive Environments

How To Communicate Securely in Repressive Environments: "

Important: Please check the excellent comments provided by iRevolution readers below for additional tactics/technologies and corrections. The purpose of this blog post was to inform and elicit feedback so thank you very much for improving on what I’ve written!

FYI – I keep an up-to-date guide based on the content and comments below. Please contact me if you would like a copy.

I’m preparing to give a presentation at The Fletcher Summer Institute for the Advanced Study of Nonviolent Conflict (FSI 2009). The focus of my presentation will be on digital security, i.e., how to communicate safely and securely in repressive, non-permissive environments. I’d be very grateful for feedback on the information below.

As I’m currently consulting on a major digital activism project in a repressive country, this post also serves to inform implementing partners on matters related to digital security.

I’d be very grateful for feedback on the information below.

Introduction

Core to effective strategic nonviolent action is the need to remain proactive and on the offensive; the rationale being that both the resistance movement and repressive regime have an equal amount of time allocated when the show-down begins. If the movement becomes idle at any point, this may give the regime the opportunity to regain the upper hand, or vice versa. The same principle is found in Clausewitz’s writings on war.

Nonviolent resistance movements are typically driven by students, i.e., young people, who are increasingly born digital natives. With expanding access to mobile phones, social networking software and online platforms for user-generated content such as blogs, the immediate financial cost of speaking out against repressive regimes is virtually nil. So resistance movements are likely to make even more use of new communication technology and digital media in the future. In fact, they already are.

At the same time, however, the likelihood and consequences of getting caught are high, especially for those political activists without any background or training in digital security. Indeed, recent research by Digital Democracy research suggests that organizational hierarchies are being broken down as youth adopt new technologies. While this empowers them they are also put at risk since they don’t tend to be as consequence-conscious as their adult counterparts.

Empire Strikes Back

It is no myth that repressive regimes are becoming increasingly more savvy in their ability to effectively employ sophisticated filtering, censoring, monitoring technologies (often courtesy of American companies like Cisco) to crack down on resistance movements. In other words, political activists need to realize that their regimes are becoming smarter and more effective, not dumber and hardly clueless.

That said, there are notable—at times surprising—loopholes. During the recent election violence in Iran, for example, facebook.com was blocked but not facebook.com/home.php. In any case, repressive regimes will continue to block more sites impose information blockades because they tend to view new media and digital technologies as a threat.

Perhaps technologies of liberation are a force more powerful?

In order to remain on the offensive against repressive regimes, nonviolent civil resistance movements need to ensure they are up to speed on digital security, if only for defense purposes. Indeed, I am particularly struck by the number of political activists in repressive regimes who aren’t aware of the serious risks they take when they use their mobile phones or the Internet to communicate with other activists.

Adaptive Learning

One way to stay ahead is to make the learning curve less steep for political activists and to continually update them with the latest tested tactics and technologies. To be sure, one way to keep the upper hand in this cyber game of cat-and-mouse is to continue adapting and learning as quickly as possible. We need to ensure that feedback mechanisms are in place.

There are clearly trade-offs between security and convenience or usability, particularly in the context of technologies. As DigiActive notes in the graphic below, the most secure tactics and technologies may not be the most convenient or easy to deploy. Most political activists are not tech-savvy.

This means that digital activists need to design tactics and technologies that are easy to learn and deploy.

The tactics and technologies listed in the next sections fall into all four different quadrants to one extent or another. It is important that political activists at minimum master the easy and convenient digital security tactics and technologies identified in this blog post.

Recall that both sides are allocated an equal amount of time to plan and execute their operations. Accelerating the learning process is one way for activist networks to remain pro-active and stay ahead of the curve. This is in part is the role that DigiActive seeks to play. Unlike the hierarchical, centralized structures of repressive regimes, networks have more flexibility and feedback loops, which make them more adaptable.

The normative motivation behind my research on digital resistance is based on the recognition by “many scholars and practitioners […] that the techniques associated with strategic nonviolent social movements are greatly enhanced by access to modern information communication technologies, such as mobile telephony, short message service (SMS), email and the World Wide Web, among others” (Walker 2007).

The potential to leverage those techniques is what makes Digital Security so important to integrate in the strategic and tactical repertoire of civil resistance movements.

Digital Security

I define digital security (DS) in the context of digital resistance as the art and science of staying safe when communicating in non-permissive environments. The reason I call it both an art and a science is to emphasize that both tactics and technology play an important role in staying safe when facing repression.

So the DS framework I want to propose is two-pronged: tactics vs. technology, and safety vs. security. I call it the 4-square approach for obvious reasons:

• DS tactics: these can be “technology free” tactics as well as tactics that apply communication technology.

• DS technologies: these include both high-tech and low-tech technologies that are designed to improve safe and secure communication in repressive environments.

• Personal safety: in this context refers to physical, personal safety when communicating in non-permissive environments.

• Data Security: refers to the security of the data when communicated from one devise to another.

As the graphic above suggests, personal safety and data security are a function of both tactics and technologies. For example, data security is best ensured when combining tactics and technologies.

What follows is a list of tactics and technologies for communicating safely and securely in repressive environments. The list is divided into technology categories and the bullet points are listed in order of relative convenience and easy to more complicated but more secure.

Note that the information below is in no way meant to be exhaustive, so please do send suggestions! (See also the conclusion for a list of reference and suggestions on further reading).

Digital Security Tactics

As mentioned above, DS tactics come as both technology-free tactics and tactics that relate to communication technology. For example, making sure to pay for a sim card in cash and out of sight of security cameras is a technology-free tactic that increases the chances of staying safe. Removing the batteries from your mobile phone to prevent it from being geo-located is a tactic that relates to the technology and also increases your safety.

DS tactics can also improve data security when communicating information. “Sneakernet” is a technology-free tactic to share information. The term is used to describe tactics whereby the transfer of electronic information such computer files is done by physically carrying removable media such as hard drives and disk drives. In contrast, using encryption software for mobile phones is a tactic that uses technology. The communication may be intercepted by eavesdroppers but they may be unable to decipher the message itself.

These tactics are listed below along with a number of other important ones. Please keep in mind that tactics are case- and context-specific. They need to be adapted to the local situation.

• Mobile Phones
  
  
  
  • Purchase your mobile phone far from where you live. Buy lower-end, simple phones that do not allow third-party applications to be installed. Higher-end ones with more functionalities carry more risk. Use cash to purchase your phone and SIM card. Avoid town centers and find small or second-hand shops as these are unlikely to have security cameras. Do not give your real details if asked; many shops do not ask for proof of ID.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Use multiple SIM cards and multiple phones and only use pay-as-you go options; they are more expensive but required for anonymity.
  
  
  • Remove the batteries from your phone if you do not want to be geo-located and keep the SIM card out of the phone when not in use and store in separate places.Use your phone while in a moving vehicle to reduces probability of geo-location.
  
  
  • Never say anything that may incriminate you in any way.
  
  
  • Use code.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Use Beeping instead of SMS whenever possible. Standard text messages are visible to the network operator, including location, phone and SIM card identifiers. According to this recent paper, the Chinese government has established 2,800 SMS surveillance centers around the country to monitor and censor text messages. The Chinese firm Venus Info Tech Ltd sells real-time content monitoring and filtering for SMS.
  
  
  • Use fake names for your address book and memorize the more important numbers. Frequently delete your text messages and call history and replace them with random text messages and calls. The data on your phone is only deleted if it is written over with new data. This means that deleted SMS and contact numbers can sometimes be retrieved (with a free tool like unDeleteSMS. Check your phone’s settings to see whether it can be set to not store sent texts messages and calls.
  
  
  • Eavesdropping in mobile phone conversations is technically complicated although entirely possible using commercially available technology. Do not take mobile phones with you to meetings as they can be turned into potential listening/tracking devices. Network operators can remotely activate a phone as a recording device regardless of whether someone is using the phone or whether the phen is even switched on. This functionality is available on US networks.
  
  
  • Network operators can also access messages or contact information stored on the SIM card. If surveillance takes place with the co-operation of the operator, little can be done to prevent the spying.
  
  
  • Mobile viruses tend to spread easily via Bluetooth so the latter should be turned off when not in use.
  
  
  • Using open Bluetooth on phones in group situations, e.g., to share pictures, etc., can be dangerous. At the same time, it is difficult to incriminate any one person and a good way to share information when the cell phone network and Internet are down.
  
  
  • Discard phones that have been tracked and burn them; it is not sufficient to simply destroy the SIM card and re-use the phone.
  
  
  
  

• Digital Cameras
  
  
  
  • Keep the number of sensitive pictures on your camera to a minimum.
  
  
  • Add plenty of random non-threatening pictures (not of individuals) and have these safe pictures locked so when you do a “delete all” these pictures stay on the card.
  
  
  • Keep the battery out of the camera when not in use so it can’t be turned on by others.
  
  
  • Practice taking pictures without having to look at the view screen.
  
  
  
  

• Computers/Laptops
  
  
  
  • Use passphrases for all your sensitive data.
  
  
  • Keep your most sensitive files on flash disks and find safe places to hide them.
  
  
  • Have a contingency plan to physically destroy or get rid of your computer at short notice.
  
  
  
  

• Flash disks
  
  
  
  • Purchase flash disks that don’t look like flash disks.
  
  
  • Keep flash disks hidden.
  
  
  
  

• Email communication
  
  
  
  • Use code.
  
  
  • Use passphrases instead of passwords and change them regularly. Use letters, numbers and other characters to make them “c0mpLeX!”. Do not use personal information and changer your passphrases each month. Do not use the same password for multiple sites.
  
  
  • Never use real names for email addresses and use multiple addresses.
  
  
  • Discard older email accounts on a regular basis and create new ones.
  
  
  • Know the security, safety and privacy policies of providers and monitor any chances (see terms of service tracker).
  
  
  
  

• Browsers and websites
  
  
  
  • Turn off java and other potentially malicious add-ons.
    
    
  
  
  • Learn IP addresses of visited websites so that history shows only numbers and not names.
  
  
  • When browsing on a public computer, delete your private data (search history, passwords, etc.) before you leave.
  
  
  • When signing up for an account where you will be publishing sensitive media, do not use your personal email address and don’t give personal information.
  
  
  • Don’t download any software from pop-ups, they may be malicious and attack your computer or record your actions online.
  
  
  • Do not be logged in to any sensitive site while having another site open.
  
  
  
  

• VoIP
  
  
  
  • Just because your talking online doesn’t mean you are not under surveillance.
  
  
  • As with a cell or landline, use code do not give salient details about your activities, and do not make incriminating statements.
  
  
  • Remember that your online activities can be surveilled using offline techniques. It doesn’t matter if you are using encrypted VOIP at a cyber cafe if the person next to you is an under-cover police officer.
  
  
  • When possible, do not make sensitive VOIP calls in a cyber cafe. It is simply too easy for someone to overhear you. If you must, use code that doesn’t stand out.
  
  
  
  

• Blogs and social networking sites
  
  
  
  • Know the laws in your country pertaining to liability, libel, etc.
  
  
  • When signing up for a blog account where you will be publishing sensitive content, do not use you personal email address or information.
  
  
  • In your blog posts and profile page, do not post pictures of yourself or your friends, do not use your real name, and do not give personal details that could help identify you (town, school, employer, etc.).
  
  
  • Blog platforms like wordpress allow uses to automatically publish a post on a designated date and time. Use this functionality to auto-publish on a different day when you are away from the computer.
  
  
  • On social networks, create one account for activism under a false but real-sounding name (so your account won’t be deleted) but don’t tell your friends about it. The last thing you want is a friend writing on your wall or tagging you in a photo and giving away your identity.
  
  
  • Even if you delete your account on a social networking site, your data will remain, so be very careful about taking part in political actions (i.e., joining sensitive groups) online.
  
  
  • Never join a sensitive group with your real account. Use your fake account to join activism groups. (The fake account should not be linked to your fake email).
  
  
  • Don’t use paid services. Your credit card can be linked back to you.
  
  
  
  

• File sharing
  
  
  
  • Use a shared Gmail account with a common passphrase and simply save emails instead of sending. Change passphrase monthly.
  
  
  • For sharing offline, do not label storage devices (CDs, flash drives) with the true content. If you burn a CD with an illegal video or piece of software on it, write an album label on it.
  
  
  • Don’t leave storage devices in places where they would be easily found if your office or home were searched (i.e., on a table, in a desk drawer).
  
  
  • Keep copies of your data on two flash drives and keep them hidden in separate locations.
  
  
  • When thinking of safe locations, consider who else has access. Heavily-traveled locations are less safe.
  
  
  • Don’t travel with sensitive data on you unless absolutely necessary. If you need to, make sure to hide it on your person or “camouflage” it (label a data CD as a pop music CD). See Sneakernet.
  
  
  
  

• Internet Cafes
  
  
  
  • Assume you are being watched.
  
  
  • Assume computers at cyber cafes are tracking key strokes and capturing screenshots.
  
  
  • Avoid cyber cafes without an easy exit and have a contingency plan if you need to leave rapidly.
  
  
  
  

Digital Security Technologies

When combine with the tactics described above, the following technologies can help you stay safe and keep your data relatively more secure.

• Mobile phones
  
  
  
  • Use CryptoSMS, SMS 007 or Kryptext to text securely (this requires java-based phones).
  
  
  • Use Android Guardian as soon as it becomes available.
  
  
  • Access mobile versions of websites as they are usually not blocked. In addition, connecting to mobile websites provides for faster connections.
  
  
  
  

• Digital cameras
  
  
  
  • Use scrubbing software such as: JPEG stripper to remove the metadata (Exif data) from your pictures before you upload/email.
  
  
  • Have a safe Secure Digital Card (SD) that you can swap in. Preferably, use a mini SD card with a mini SD-SD converter. Then place the mini SD into a compatible phone for safekeeping.
  
  
  
  

• Computers/Laptops
  
  
  
  • Use an effective anti-virus program and ensure it updates itself online at least once a day: TMIS, McAfee, Symantec/Norton, AVG, Avira, NOD32, Kaspersky.
  
  
  • Do not use illegal, cracked, hacked, pwned, warez software.
  
  
  • Keep your software programs (operating systems, productivity suites, browsers) up-to-date with the latest software updates.
  
  
  • Use software to encrypt your hard drive: Bitlocker, TrueCrypt, PGP Whole Disk Encryption, Check Point, Dekart Private Disk.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  • Use a different file type to hide your sensitive files. For example, the .mov file extension will make a large file look like a movie.
  
  
  • Mac users can use Little Snitch to track all the data that goes into and out of your computer.
  
  
  • From a technical perspective, there’s no such thing as the delete function. Your deleted data is eventually written over with new data. There are two common ways to wipe sensitive data from your hard drive or storage device. You can wipe a single file or you can wipe all of the ‘unallocated’ space on the drive. Eraser is a free and open-source secure deletion tool that is extremely easy to use.
  
  
  
  

• Flash disks
  
  
  
  • StealthySurfer USB Flash Drive
  
  
  • The secure browsing Tor software can be installed on flash disk.
  
  
  • Using a USB watch calls less attention as do the USB ear rings and this credit card USB flash disk.
  
  
  
  

• Email communication
  
  
  
  • Use https when using Gmail.
  
  
  • Use encrypted email platforms such as Hushmail and RiseUp.
  
  
  
  

• Browsers and websites
  
  
  
  • Use Firefox and get certain plugins to follow website tracking such as ghostery and adblock, adart to remove ads/trackers.
  
  
  • User Tor software or Psiphon to browse privately and securely.
  
  
  • I shan’t list access points for secure browsers, Proxy servers and VPNs here. Please email me for a list.
  
  
  • Always use https in “Settings/General/Browser Connection.”
  
  
  
  

• VoIP
  
  
  
  • Use Skype but not TOM Skype (Chinese version). Note that Skype is not necessarily 100% secure since no one has access to the source code to verify.
  
  
  • Off The Record (OTR) is a good encryption plugin. For example, use Pidgin with OTR (you need to add the plug-in yourself).
  
  
  • Gizmo offer encryption for voice conversations, and then only if you are calling another VoIP user, as opposed to a mobile or landline telephone. However, because neither application is open-source, independent experts have been unable to test them fully and ensure that they are secure.
  
  
  • Adium is a free IM application for Macs with built-in OTR encryption that integrates most other IM applications.
  
  
  
  

• Blogs and social networking platforms
  
  
  
  • There are no safe social networks. The best way to be safe on a social network is fake account and a proxy server.
  
  
  • The anonymous blogging platform Invisiblog no longer exists, so the best bet now is WordPress + Proxy (preferably Tor) + anonymity of content.
  
  
  • Log out of facebook.com when not using the site.
  
  
  
  

• File sharing
  
  
  
  • Use Drop.io to create a private, secure media sharing site.
  
  
  • Use BasecampHQ with secure/SSL option to create more specific usernames and passwords for each user or remote site.
  
  
  
  

• Internet Cafe
  
  
  
  • Tor can be installed on flash disk and used at Internet cafe and also used from LiveCDs if flash drives are not allowed.
  
  
  
  

• Other potential tech
  
  

• LiveScribe (see explanation here).


• FreedomFone

Conclusion

The above material was collected in part from these sources:

• Tactical Tech’s Mobiles-in-a-Box and Security-in-a-Box;


• MobileActive’s Mobile Security


• FreeBeagles;


• FLOSS Manuals;


• Feedback from DigiActive and Digital Democracy;


• Personal experience and that of other colleagues in the field.

As mentioned above, please send suggestions and/or corrections as well as updates. And again, please do check the comments below. Thanks!

Patrick Philippe Meier

"